On Wednesday, the U.S. ambassador, Mike Waltz, presented a draft United Nations Security Council resolution to partner nations. This resolution aims to advance President Donald Trump’s peace initiative for Gaza, which includes authorizing an international security force, a senior U.S. official reported.
Waltz recently convened meetings with representatives from Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. These nations are anticipated to coordinate humanitarian and reconstruction efforts related to the proposed plan. The draft resolution seeks to approve a two-year international stabilization force in Gaza, operating under U.N. supervision. This constitutes what officials refer to as “phase two” of the broader postwar strategy.
According to reports from Reuters and the Associated Press, the draft would empower the mission to employ “all necessary measures” to ensure Gaza’s security, safeguard civilians, and initiate the demilitarization of armed groups once extensive combat operations cease. The plan also involves establishing a transitional “Board of Peace” to facilitate coordination with Egypt, Israel, and a thoroughly vetted Palestinian police force.
Washington has ruled out deploying U.S. combat troops but has requested contributions from Muslim-majority nations, including Indonesia, Egypt, the U.A.E., and Turkey. However, Israeli officials have already stated their refusal to permit Turkish troops along their borders.
The meeting, which saw participation from the Palestinian Authority, represented a rare diplomatic engagement. Its significance stems from the U.S. plan’s vision of returning authority to the PA following reforms, a condition that Israel opposes, as reported by Axios.
In an interview with Digital, John Spencer, who chairs urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute, suggested that the concept could succeed if it emulates effective historical precedents. “For Gaza, I personally would like people to think of Kosovo and Bosnia,” he remarked. “History shows exactly what determines success: a clear mandate, enough troops and the authority to act.”
Following the 1999 NATO campaign, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) was deployed under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244. Comprising approximately 50,000 troops, its mission was to stabilize the region, separate combatants, and rebuild governance.
“Kosovo gives you the best example,” Spencer stated. “It had a clear disarmament mandate, a capable coalition and enough troops to enforce peace.”
He cautioned that Gaza would necessitate comparable patience. “If somebody believes this will just disappear from the news in six months, that’s not reality,” he said, pointing out that KFOR remains deployed decades later, albeit with a reduced troop presence.
The 1995 Dayton Accords brought an end to the Bosnian War and authorized the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), subsequently followed by the Stabilization Force (SFOR). Around 60,000 troops were deployed to enforce peace, separate armies, and support reconstruction efforts.
“These were significant forces with clear mandates for disarming,” Spencer observed. “That’s what success looks like — a mission with both muscle and legitimacy.”
He further advised that Gaza’s mission must mirror Bosnia’s robust command structure and clear legal authority, rather than relying on unarmed observers.
In East Timor, an Australian-led mission entered under U.N. authority in 1999 after violence erupted post-independence. It successfully restored order and established the foundations for local governance.
“East Timor shows how quickly you can start rebuilding governance when the force has legitimacy and local trust,” Spencer commented. “That legitimacy must exist from day one in Gaza.”
In contrast, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), established in 1978 and expanded after the 2006 conflict, is considered a failure by Spencer.
“Southern Lebanon was not a success story,” he declared. “They were glorified observers without a mandate to demilitarize anything.”
Israel has consistently criticized UNIFIL for allowing Hezbollah to consolidate its position under its purview. Spencer stressed that the same error must not be repeated in Gaza. “It has to be seen as liberating areas from militant rule, not occupying them,” he asserted.
Spencer articulated an “inkblot strategy,” involving the stabilization of cleared districts while combat continues elsewhere. “You can create safe areas where a stabilization force, under the right mandate and equipped correctly, is stabilizing areas while you are also conducting operations against Hamas,” he explained.
He predicts that the Israel Defense Forces will persist with high-intensity operations, while the international force concentrates on humanitarian aid, demining, and restoring order in secured zones. “Part of the lesson is giving people a vision of life after Hamas,” Spencer noted.
During a recent visit to Gaza, Spencer mentioned witnessing “a glimmer of hope” in newly established humanitarian zones within cleared areas. “If you start quickly, even on a small scale, success builds success,” he remarked.
Approximately 200 U.S. personnel are already stationed in a civil-military coordination center in Israel, managing logistics and planning for the proposed transition. Spencer emphasized that this small presence will be crucial for coordinating aid, reconstruction, and stabilization without engaging in combat.
He warned that the mission would encounter disinformation and aggression from groups opposing peace. “There are people who do not want this to succeed,” he stated. “Thinking through how they’ll try to undermine it — especially online — is vital.”
He added that stabilization efforts must advance concurrently with local capacity-building. “You have to start training a vetted Palestinian police force and governance team,” he advised. “That’s how you build legitimacy.”