As the precarious Gaza ceasefire continues, a concept to divide the Strip into two distinct zones is gathering momentum. One zone would represent life under Hamas’s control, while the other would showcase a vision of existence free from the militant group.
Given that Arab nations have indicated they won’t finance reconstruction as long as Hamas retains authority, U.S. and Israeli authorities are considering an alternative strategy: rebuilding areas of Gaza that remain under Israeli oversight, specifically those behind what Israeli officials term the “yellow line.” Experts suggest this initiative aims to establish a tangible model of stability and renewal, potentially encouraging transformation within territories still governed by the group.
Approximately 58% of the Gaza Strip, comprising areas like all of Rafah in the south, significant portions of Khan Younis, and northern districts such as Beit Lahia and Shujaiyya, are presently under Israeli control, situated beyond the designated “yellow line.” Hamas maintains authority over the rest of the territory, including the densely populated Gaza City. Even with the IDF’s presence, Hamas operatives continue to be active close to the front lines.
John Spencer, the Urban Warfare Institute’s executive director, characterized the proposal to split Gaza into two separate zones—one governed by Israel and the other by Hamas—with reconstruction permitted solely in the Israeli-controlled sector, as both a “practical and psychological test, designed to illustrate to Gazans the potential for life without Hamas.”
Spencer referred to this concept as the “Disneyland strategy,” noting it originated from American counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.
“One identifies a segment of the issue—in this context, geographical terrain—and eliminates all undesirable elements: Hamas, tunnels, weaponry, and so forth,” he elaborated. “Subsequently, civilians are allowed entry, and new infrastructure is developed—markets, structures, educational facilities, power grids. We dubbed it Disneyland because our intention was for it to symbolize hope, representing the future.”
He explained that the approach aligns with the “clear, hold, build” framework previously employed in Iraq and other locations, where military forces progressively secured neighborhoods. “In Ramadi, this was executed block by block until the entire city was covered,” he stated. “The process involves holding an area, clearing it, then enabling local populations to assume control. This method has historical validation. It is not necessary to eradicate Hamas from all of Gaza to commence this initiative.”
Spencer articulated the objective as providing Gazans—and the international community—a concrete demonstration of life unburdened by Hamas.
“One constructs a small pocket of positive development, a sort of Disneyland, to illustrate to everyone what can be achieved,” he commented. “Furthermore, it would offer nations intending to contribute stabilization forces a clear task: securing areas that have been cleared of Hamas presence.”
Nevertheless, he cautioned that this concept is not a definitive solution. “There will be territories on the opposing side of the demarcation line where Hamas believes it retains control,” he noted. “Establishing something distinct from Hamas is crucial both for overcoming the group and for presenting a vision of a future to the populace.”
Within Hamas-governed Gaza, fear continues to dominate daily existence. “Since the ceasefire began, we live in terror,” an anonymous resident disclosed to Digital, requesting anonymity due to fears of reprisal.
“We have no desire to remain under Hamas’s rule. It is profoundly unsettling for us to learn that Jared Kushner stated reconstruction would occur solely in regions not controlled by Hamas. There were claims Hamas would be eliminated, yet they have returned, more formidable, and we remain confined.”
“Food is abundant; indeed, all types of provisions are accessible in the markets,” he added. “All goods are once again available, and prices are steadily decreasing. Life has resumed, but devastation is visible throughout.”
For individuals residing on this side of the yellow line, the idea of reconstructing a new Gaza on the opposing side—even if modest in scale—evokes a sense of liberation.
Hussam al-Astal, who heads a faction in Khan Younis, informed Digital, “Our aim is not to govern Gaza or to acquire power. Our initiative, following the rule and eventual downfall of the Hamas-ISIS administration, is to safeguard the populace and guide them through a transitional period to civilian-led institutions that govern righteously, uninfluenced by personal agendas.”
He alleged that Hamas redirected its weaponry internally during the ceasefire. “We implore the international community to shield us from Hamas’s terrorism,” he asserted. “We are not contending for any specific individual’s governance. We are striving for a life of dignity. We are fighting for a renewed Gaza.”
Several sources indicate that Israel has already provided restricted assistance to al-Astal and other anti-Hamas groups operating locally.
“A preliminary example was observed when the Majayda clan, collaborating with anti-Hamas combatant Hosam al-Astal and receiving aerial support from the IDF, successfully repelled Hamas in a confined skirmish,” Joseph Braude, president of the Center for Peace Communications, conveyed to Digital. “This represents a minor illustration of what is anticipated on a larger scale—indigenous forces, supported by Israel, dislodging Hamas from the ground up.”
Spencer and Braude both concur that the developing scenario of “two Gazas” is not coincidental; rather, it is integral to the Trump administration’s plan.
“We are nearing a novel situation where it becomes viable for reconstruction to commence in a section of the Strip—specifically, the regions beyond the yellow line—even as conflict persists in the remainder of Gaza,” Braude stated. “Hamas is not a signatory to the agreement but an aggressor. Reconstruction does not depend on Hamas’s collaboration. It will proceed in areas where Hamas cannot function, while efforts to eradicate its presence carry on elsewhere in the Strip.”
Braude explained that the strategy foresees “emerging self-governing enclaves that will progressively coalesce into a unified front—forming the groundwork for what might be designated a Gazan Interim Transitional Authority.”
He concluded by asserting, “Cultivating local combat forces to oppose Hamas is a capability that Gazans endorse and which Israel and its allies possess. Establishing an effective government characterized by continuity, a system based on rules, and stable institutions—that constitutes the more formidable challenge.”